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Abstract
The main purpose of this research is to investigate the size and the relationship between 
smuggling and crime indexes such as returned checks, corruption and drinking alcohol in 
Iran during the period 1984–2015 by using Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) 
model and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method. The results showed that among 
the crime indexes, divorce, drinking alcohol and corruption were positively correlated with 
smuggling, while another crime index, returned checks had a negative relationship with 
smuggling. Besides, all socio-economic cause variables on smuggling, including tariffs, 
misery index, illiteracy, gap of exchange rate, economic openness index and the size of 
government were found to increase smuggling. Furthermore, the findings showed that the 
cause variables on smuggling, including liquidity and energy consumption were positively 
correlated with smuggling.
Keywords: Crime, misery index, illiteracy, corruption, MIMIC, smuggling.
JEL Classification: C01, C22, C51 E26, H2.
Introduction
High crime rates and associated social disorders are considered to be among the most 
complicated issues in most urban areas worldwide, as they create a sense of public insecurity 
and impose financial burdens on society, the government and judicial system on the one 
hand; and change the ethical atmosphere of the society on the other. Existing statistics have 
revealed that solutions such as enlarging police forces, taking stricter security measures, 
imposing more severe punishment as well as constructing more prisons do not prove to be 
effective deterrents. This unpleasant phenomenon is usually considered regardless of the 
local, social, economic and cultural conditions which influence criminals. Nevertheless, to 
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combat crime and social wrongdoings, crime-inducing factors and their interrelationship 
with the different kinds of crime need to be carefully identified. It is believed that through 
eradicating such factors or diluting their effects, the incidence of crime can be prevented or 
at least reduced.
Accordingly, crime is considered as an undesirable social phenomenon that investigation of 
its causes has attracted the attention of economists since the late 1960s. One of the earliest 
studies on the economic background of crime was by Fleisher (1963). By examining 
the relationship between crime and unemployment, he concluded that there was a direct 
relationship between crime rate and unemployment (Fleisher, 1963). The relationship 
between poverty and unemployment was later confirmed by scholars such as Witt et al. 
(1998), Brush (2007), and Choe (2008). However, the background of theoretical studies 
on the causes and motivation to commit crime perhaps dates back to the works of Tullock 
(1967) and Becker (1968). Addressing the issue of robbery in monopoly, Tullock (1967) 
reported that robbery could lead to a reduction in resources investment due to the increase 
in welfare costs. In turn, Becker analyzed the rational behavior of criminals by presenting 
a theoretical model in purely economic analysis. In his view, criminals possessed rational 
behavior and they participated in criminal activities with profit-seeking incentives (Becker, 
1968). According to Becker and Stigler (1974), and Akerlof and Dickens (1982), low wages 
by authorities had led to increased corruption, and paying decent wages was suggested 
as a solution to this problem (Akerlof & Dickens, 1982; Becker & Stigler, 1974). In a 
similar vein, Mauro (1995) examined the relationship between crime and economic growth 
rate. Likewise, Mauro (1995) and Wei (2000) evaluated the vulnerability of foreign direct 
investment and total investment resulting from corruption. Witte (1996), considered ghettos 
as important features of the US urban areas where an underground economy tended to 
flourish illegally in the social and economic life of people in the ghettos. Witte (1996) 
further noted that drugs and crime were linked as drugs were traded in an underground 
economy by organized gang members.
Similarly, Kaufmann (1997) argued that, with increasing economic corruption, production 
costs were likely to rise and that firms and companies tended to turn towards underground 
and illegal economic activities. By the same token, Tanzi and Davoudi (1998) maintained 
that corruption could lead to a decline in public sector budgets and structural productivity in 
the country. In another study, Aigner et al. (1988) showed a direct relationship between the 
increasing size of government and tendency towards smuggling. Moreover, there is also an 
reverse relationship between education and corruption (Treisman, 2000).
Aidt (2003) also investigated the relationship between an increase in social spending and 
a reduction in social welfare caused by corruption. In another study reported by Wang, 
Lin, and Yu (2006), a positive correlation was evident between the size of the underground 
economy and the logarithm of real government consumption and inflation rate. Their findings 
showed that crime rates and unemployment did not have any meaningful correlation with 
the underground economy. In describing the relationship between labor market variables 
and crime, Rickman and Witt (2007) considered personality traits and individual tendencies 
as effective in committing crime. In another study, Rose-Ackerman (2013) examined crime 
in terms of the political economy. The study discussed the connections between voters, 
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legislators, interest groups, state bureaucracy, and corruption in the private sector, and also 
the relationship between corruption and democracy. Likewise, Cooter and Ulen (2016), 
examined crime in terms of expected profits; that is, if the final benefits of crime exceeds 
its expected final cost, the commission of the crime has an economic justification and, 
therefore, the crime happens.
The exact nature of the underground economy is not widely agreed upon. It is mainly 
composed of two types: criminal and non-criminal activities. As for criminal activities, 
diverse issues including illegal activities such as smuggling weapons, drugs, foreign 
exchange, illegal immigration, brand abuse, tax evasion, money laundering and corruption 
are involved. Similarly, empirical studies have shown that underground economic activities 
usually go hand in hand with crime and involve unpermitted medications, prostitution, money 
laundering and illegal gambling (Smith & Christou, 2009). Smuggling, returned checks, 
corruption and drinking alcohol are some of the recognized types of criminal activities in 
Iran’s punishment law. Primary studies on illegal economic activities in various sectors of 
Iran have indicated the importance and role of smuggling in Iran’s economy. Seemingly, the 
tendency to violate laws such as tax, customs duties and social security expenses as well as 
disregarding rationing, quotas, standards and laws enforced by the government are among 
the most important features of hidden and underground activities in Iran’s economy.
Thus, as most types of crime are closely related, this study is intended to examine the 
size and relationship between smuggling and crime indexes. To this end, this article is 
organized into four sections; after the introduction, definition of the underground economy 
is suggested in the second section. The research methods, model used and estimation of 
the parameters of the model are described in the third section. Results from examining the 
model of smuggling in Iran are analyzed in the fourth section.
Literature Review
Merton (1967) argued that crime and violence were directly related to the absence of 
opportunities for achieving social mobility through legitimate channels. Some other 
researchers postulated that criminal activities were no more than redistribution of wealth. For 
example, burglary and ransom kidnapping, which were bilateral or trilateral, involved the 
victim(s), perpetrator(s) and perhaps a middleman to dispose of the resulting merchandise 
or money. However, economically motivated crime involved the production and distribution 
of goods and services facilitated by the underground economy (Naylor, 1995). Naylor 
(1995) emphasized that crime and the underground economy were correlated at many 
levels. Likewise, Merton (1967) and Noguera (1996) surmised that crime and violence were 
not random phenomena, but rather followed more or less the same pattern. They further 
argued that the lack of economic opportunities in many impoverished urban communities 
created conditions that were conducive to the occurrence of crime and development of an 
underground economy (Merton, 1967; Noguera, 1996).
In a similar vein, Johnson et al. (1998) and Friedman et al. (2000) opined that the key 
determinants of underground activities were not tax rates, but rather the extent of regulatory 
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discretion. It was believed that when regulations were laxed and the rule of law was weak, 
bureaucrats were allowed to make decisions on individual cases without supervision. 
This, in turn, created corruption in firms and companies (Friedman et al., 2000; Johnson 
et al., 1998). According to Glinkina (1999), due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
underground economic relations developed above all; and long established links between 
separate industries and whole territories were disrupted, and borders between new states 
became permeable, presenting few obstacles to smuggling or other forms of criminal 
entrepreneurship.
Bate (2000) reported that revenue losses resulting from organized crime forced governments 
to cut down on expenses for public services, increased taxation or even ran deficits. In 
fact, Bate (2000) posited that smuggling was an important catalyst in stimulating the 
underground economy. In a similar vein, Schneider (2005) held that the shadow economy 
reduced corruption in high income countries, but the opposite was true for low income 
countries. Generally, there is wide range of theoretical and practical literature tackling the 
relationship between economic variables and smuggling using the MIMIC method (Albu, 
Iorgulescu, & Stanica, 2010; Bajada & Schneider, 2009; Dell’Anno, 2010; Dell’Anno & 
Schneider, 2009; Dobre & Alexandru, 2009; Schneider, 2015; Schneider & Enste, 2000; 
Wang et al., 2006).
In the meantime, it was believed that those who were involved in smuggling-related activities 
preferred to conduct their transactions in cash. Therefore, by increasing the volume of 
smuggling, the demand for money in circulation was expected to increase. Accordingly, 
imposing more limitations on individuals could push them toward illegal trading, smuggling 
or submitting unreal statements to officials. Imposing extra import tariffs could also lead to 
under-representation of the value of imported goods, and therefore, trading of commodities 
illegally. Phylakits (1992) showed the positive effect of tariff obstacles on individuals’ 
motivation to trade illegally. In fact, when trade limitations, frustrating regulations and 
tariff and non-tariff obstacles increased, individuals tended to perform illegal businesses. 
On the contrary, some other studies emphasized swift and refreshing openness to trade. 
However, without the efficient fulfillment of laws, corruption could increase (Phylaktis, 
1991). Tanzi (1999) argued that the relationship between the rate of unemployment and 
shadow economy was vague. Therefore, the economic hypotheses cannot for certain reveal 
the relationship between the rate of unemployment and the shadow economy. Thus, such 
a probable relationship mainly depended on empirical analyses conducted in each country 
under investigation.
In turn, the misery index is, an economic indicator which is obtained by adding the rate of 
unemployment to the rate of inflation (Tanzi, 1999). Biswas and Marjit (2007) theoretically 
showed the relationship between the rate of foreign exchange in black markets and illegal 
trading. In effect, an increase in the price of consumer goods could also be considered as 
a causal factor in the size of smuggling. Moreover, an increase in inflation pushed more 
households below the poverty line and caused them to turn to smuggling. On the other hand, 
an increase in price led to a rise in the income of people and enterprises, which resulted 
in growth in their income tax payments. This, in turn, could lead to illegal activities in 
society.
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Considering the fact that the high rate of unemployment is one of the most crucial challenges 
in developing countries, studying its effects on smuggling is deemed significant. However, 
the influence of this variable on smuggling is vague (Biswas & Marjit, 2007). According to 
Smith and Christou (2009), all economies which have aforementioned features are among 
the active economic markets. Based on this index, the underground economy is not defined 
as an illegal activity (Frey & Weck-Hanneman, 1984), as it clearly includes trading and 
barter transactions (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Zhuge et al., 2009). In contrast, Dellanno 
and Schneider (2009) reported a negative relationship between economic growth and 
underground economy.
Direct links between smuggling and crime have already been investigated in the literature; 
however, the current study was an attempt to examine different dimensions of moral crimes 
on direct and indirect trafficking. Thus, the main purpose of this research was to investigate 
the size and the relationship between smuggling and some crime indexes such as returned 
checks, corruption and drinking alcohol in Iran during the period between 1984 and 2015 by 
using MIMIC model and MLE method. More precisely, this research examined the mutual 
and hidden effects of moral and economic crimes in Iran.
Definition of the Underground Economy
According to Ogunc and Yilmaz (2000), there is no agreed upon concept for the underground 
economy in the literature. In many studies about the underground economy, expressions 
such as, unofficial, shadow, black, gray, hidden, unobserved, irregular and illegal economy 
have been used (Alderslade, Talmadge, & Freeman, 2006; Öğünç & Yılmaz, 2000). Smith 
(1997) defined the underground economy as a market-based production which is not legally 
or illegally included in the official GNP calculations. In turn, Thomas (1999) divided the 
underground economy into four divisions and stated that on a large scale, the underground 
economy is related to all activities which are not included for any reason in national 
accounts.
Table 1
The structure of the underground economy from Thomas’s viewpoint
Section Market transaction Production form The form of production/distribution
Household None Legal Legal
Unofficial It has Legal Legal
Irregular It has Legal Illegal
Illegal It has Illegal Illegal
Source: Thomas, 1999
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He maintained that all these four sections are not similarly important in all countries and, 
most probably, the importance of these sections in every country differs as time marches 
on. Considering several studies such as Mirus, Smith and Program (1997); Mirus and Roger 
(1997) classified the underground economy as follows.
Table 2
The structure of underground economic activities from Mirus and Roger’s viewpoint
Type of 
activity Monetary transaction Non-monetary transaction
Illegal
Trading stolen commodities, producing and 
trans-activating unpermitted medication, 
smuggling, prostitution, money laundering, 
gambling, fraud, forgery, hacking computer 
systems, trading information, identity robbery
Barter transaction of medication, 
production of medication, 
robbery, smuggling for personal 
consumption
Legal
Tax evasion Tax avoidance Tax evasion
Tax 
avoidance
Unreported income earned from 
working, wage, wealth interest, 
and unreported properties, 














Source: Mirus and Roger (1997)
Similarly, Feige and Ott (1999) categorized the underground economy into four types: 
illegal, unreported, unregistered and unofficial.
ILLEGAL: All income which is earned through illegal activities and tax evasion. Activities 
include transaction of unpermitted medication, smuggling, prostitution, money laundering, 
and gambling.
UNREPORTED: All economic activities which are provided for economic and non-
economic resources in order to evade or avoid financial regimes.
UNREGISTERED: All activities needed but not registered for economic policies.
UNOFFICIAL: Economic activities which earn profit for owners through an intermediation 
process without any expenses.
Marinov (2008) defined the underground economy in three sections: unofficial, shadow and 
black economy.
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Table 3
The structure of underground economic activities from Marinov’s viewpoint
Section Activity Explanation
Unofficial Legal but unofficial activities Personal production or transactions
Gray
Legal and uncustomary 
activities 1-non registered businesses and hidden income2-illegal activities in lawful form
Black Illegal activities Trading of stolen commodities, producing and transacting unpermitted medication, smuggling
Source: Marinov, 2008.
Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes
Structure equations model (SEM) shows the relationship between unobserved and observed 
variables and is extensively applied in many fields of social science including sociology, 
marketing and economics. In economics, one of the first studies about the applications of SEM 
was carried out by Goldberg in which a special form of SEM, namely multiple-indicators 
multiple-causes was applied. Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) models are 
often employed by researchers studying the effects of an unobservable latent variable on a 
set of outcomes, where causes of the latent variable are observed. There are times, however, 
when the causes of the latent variable are not observed because measurements of the causal 
variable are contaminated by measurement errors. Generally, the MIMIC model has two 
main parts, namely structural equation and measuring equation. The structural equation 
corresponding to a series of observable indexes is as follows:
 (1) 
In which      shows the observed index in the underground economy,   is equated with 
hidden variables, iu shows accidental error and      shows the structure parameters of the 




In which px (i=1, 2, …., p) indicates a series of casual observed variables such as the rate 
of unemployment, the rate of inflation, and the rate of real tariffs,    (i=1, 2, …, p) which reflects the structural parameters of the model, V error term and     stands for hidden variable 
(i.e., smuggling ). Equations 1 and 2 can be rewritten as follows:
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hand, economic data and statistics on imports (constant prices indicated in Rials), tax on 
imports (constant prices in Rials), government expenditures (constant prices in Rials), gross 
domestic product (GDP) (constant prices in Rials), bilateral official and unofficial exchange 
rates of Rials to US dollars, illiteracy rate (percentage), energy consumption (constant 
prices in Rials), unemployment rate (percentage), inflation (percentage), liquidity (M1 and 
M2 constant prices in Rials) were derived from the Central Bank of Iran and the Statistics 
Center of Iran. In order to use such data and statistics for the purpose of this research, the 
variables used in the estimation are defined as follows:
Crime variables
Returned checks- : Returned checks due to fraud or lack of liquidity are considered as 
crime in Iranian law and are subjected to a sentence of imprisonment from six months 
to two years. Returned checks (C1) as the growth rate of the number of closed cases 
in public trials was considered as a cause variable for smuggling.
Corruption- : In this study, corruption includes embezzlement, bribery and forgery. 
Generally based on the above definitions, the variable on corruption (C3) as the 
growth rate of the number of closed cases in public trials was classified as a cause 
variable for smuggling.
Drinking-  alcohol: As many alcoholic beverages are considered as unpermitted 
commodities in Iranian law, a lot of these goods are imported illegally through 
smuggling. The variable of drinking alcohol (C4) as the growth rate of the number of 
closed cases in public trials was defined as a causal variable for smuggling.
Social variables
Divorce- : Although divorce is not considered as a social crime, it is classified as a 
causal variable for smuggling, because it leads to many social disorders for both 
couples and children. This variable is shown as C2 representing the growth rate of the 
number of closed cases in public trials.
Education- : In this study, the rate of illiteracy (percentage) was used in order to reveal 
the effects of education on smuggling, and a positive relationship between smuggling 
and the rate of illiteracy was expected. This variable is shown as ILI.
Poverty index- : The misery index to percentage (inflation plus unemployment) as 
a poverty index is a criterion to show the economic and social circumstances of 
countries. This variable is shown as MI.
 
Economic variables
The index of economic openness- : In order to calculate the index of economic 
openness, two indexes were used:
•  The growth rate of the proportion of imports to GDP, referred to as OME.
• The growth rate of tax on imports, referred to as NTM.
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Foreign exchange market changes- : Changes in foreign exchange markets can be 
also considered as an important factor for the expansion of illegal activities. The rate 
of foreign exchange is highly changeable in Iran. In this study, we considered the 
rate of foreign exchange in official and unofficial markets as the cause variables for 
smuggling. In effect, the growth rate of the gap between the rate of exchange in the 
official and unofficial (DEX) markets was considered and a positive relationship with 
smuggling was expected.
The size of government- : The growth rate of the proportion of government expenditure 
on GDP was used as the variable for government size and referred to as GG.
Money demand- : The growth of liquidity (M) was used as an index to show the 
effects of smuggling.
The consumption of oil products- : Consuming oil products and granting remarkable 
subsidies to oil products has lowered the market price of oil products in Iran 
compared to its neighboring countries like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, leading 
to an increasing tendency to smuggle oil products to these countries. For this reason, 
smuggling was expected to have a positive effect on the consumption of oil products 
in Iran. The growth in consumption of oil products is referred to as CE.
On this basis, the conceptual model of commodity smuggling in Iran can be shown as 
follows:
Figure 2. Conceptual Model of Smuggling Framework in Iran based on 




o The growth rate of tax on imports, referred to as NTM. 
! Foreign exchange market changes: Changes in foreign exchange markets can be also considered 
as an important factor for the expansion of illegal activities. The rate of foreign exchange is highly 
changeable in Iran. In this study, we considered the rate of foreign exchange in official and unofficial 
markets as the cause variables for smuggling. In effect, the growth rate of the gap between the rate of 
exchange in the official and unofficial (DEX) markets was considered and a positive relationship with 
smuggling was expected. 
! The size of government: The growth rate of the proportion of g vernment exp ditur  on GDP was 
used as the variable for government size and referred to as GG. 
! Money demand: The rowth of liquidity (M) was used as an index to show the effects of 
smuggling. 
! The consu tion of oil products: Cons ming oil products and granting remar able subsidies to oil 
products has lowered the mark t price of oil pr ducts in Iran compared to its neighboring countries 
like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, leading to an increasing tenden y to s uggle oil products to these 
countries. For this reason, smuggling was expected to have a positive effect on the consumption of oil 
products in Iran. The growth in consumption of oil products is referred to as CE. 
 
On this basis, the conceptual model of commodity smuggling in Iran can be shown as follows: 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual odel of Smuggling Framework in Iran based on MIMIC Model 
 
Source: Research result 
 
 
The Results of Stationary Test of Variables 
 
Impact of Corruption and Crime on Smuggling: Evidence from Iran
65
The Results of Stationary Test of Variables
The MIMIC model is invalid in the absence of doing a unit root stationary test of variables. 
Thus, a stationary state of variables was tested using Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) 
method and EVIEWS7 software package. Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) was also used 
to determine the length of optimal lag. The tested relationship in this study was carried out 
based on such types of relationship: none, with intercept and with intercept and trend. The 
results of the stationary test are shown in Table 4. As can be seen in Table 4, the variables 
are not unit root.
Table 4
Results of stationary test














The results of Model Estimation
The estimation of smuggling was conducted using Lisrel9.1 and MLE method. In finding 
a model of structural equations, the aim was to select the best model based on statistical 
significance of theory. For this reason, in the framework of research methodology, more than 
100 models were surveyed and tested. In order to select a superior model, two methods were 
applied. Based on Frey and Weck-Hannemann’s method (1984), in choosing the superior 
method, compliance with theoretical foundations and significant symptoms of variable 
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coefficients were prioritized. However, in Giles’s method (1999), the general estimation 
of the method was of higher priority. On this basis, Table 5 shows the results of estimating 
superior model coefficients of smuggling.
Table 5
Results of model selection
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Results from Table 5 can be summarized as follows:
1. In all superior models, the variables of divorce and drinking alcohol were positively 
correlated with smuggling, but the reverse was true for returned checks.
2. All macroeconomic variables affecting smuggling including tax on imports, misery 
index, illiteracy, the gap between official and unofficial exchange rates, the index 
of openness economy and government size led to an increase in smuggling.
 3. All variables affected by smuggling including liquidity and energy consumption 
had a positive relationship with smuggling.
4. Divorce and misery index were the most effective variables on smuggling.
To select the final model, first, models showing acceptable indexes of smuggling were chosen. 
Then, the model which had the best status according to the Lisrel criteria was selected as the 
superior model. Table 6 shows the Lisrel general estimate criteria for superior models.
Table 6
Criteria for assessing estimated models
Index R2 RMSE1 NNFI2 CFI3 AGFI4
1 0.88 1.2 0 1.6 1 0.95
2 0.84 3.4 0 1.5 1 0.87
3 0.8 3.4 0 1.4 1 0.86
4 0.61 6.8 0 1.2 1 0.79
5 0.87 7.1 0 1.2 1 0.75
Source: Research results
The quantitative results in Table 6 reveal that all models possessed proper status according 
to the general assessment criteria of Lisrel. However, their comparison suggests model 1 as 
the superior model. As variables were used with growth trend, the index of smuggling was 
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Figure 3. Trends in growth of smuggling in Iran (1984–2015) 
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Figure 3 shows the minimum growth of smuggling is -16.9% in 1986 and the maximum growth is 
13% in 1996 and 2009. To calculate the relative size of smuggling in terms of the percentage of GDP 
in Iran, six previous empirical research studies were used. The trend in the volume of smuggling 
based on the base year of 1997 and also the growth of smuggling are shown in Figure 4 as follows. 
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Figure 3. Trends in growth of smuggling in Iran (1984–2015)
Source: Research result
Figure 3 shows the minimum growth of smuggling is -16.9% in 1986 and the maximum 
growth is 13% in 1996 and 2009. To calculate the relative size of smuggling in terms of the 
percentage of GDP in Iran, six previous empirical research studies were used. The trend in 
the volume of smuggling based on the base year of 1997 and also the growth of smuggling 
are shown in Figure 4 as follows.
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Figure 4 reveals that the volume of smuggling during the period of study was upward, although with a 
fluctuating trend. The relative index of smuggling (a percentage of GDP) is shown in Figure 5 as 
follows. 
 
Based on Figure 5, the relative volume of smuggling (a percentage of GDP) starts from 22% in 1985 
and shows a downward trend to reach its minimum level of 16% in 1996. After this decline in 1996, it 
fluctuates to peak at 27% in 2015. The results of the study revealed that the volume of smuggling in 
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Figure 4 reveals that the volume of smuggling during the period of study was upward, 
although with a fluctuating trend. The relative index of smuggling (a percentage of GDP) is 
shown in Figure 5 as follows.
Based on Figure 5, the relative volume of smuggling (a percentage of GDP) starts from 22% 
in 1985 and shows a downward trend to reach its minimum level of 16% in 1996. After this 
decline in 1996, it fluctuates to peak at 27% in 2015. The results of the study revealed that 
the volume of smuggling in Iran in the study period was 19.5% of GDP, on average.
Figure 5. Trend of relative smuggling in Iran (1984–2015) (percentage of GDP)
Source: Research result
Conclusion
This research was intended to calculate the size of smuggling and its relationship with some 
crime indexes in Iran during the period between 1984 and 2015 using the MIMIC model. 
The estimation of smuggling was carried out through the software package of Lisrel9.1 
and the MLE method. For the purpose of research, more than 100 models were surveyed 
and tested. The results showed that among all superior indexes of crime variables, divorce, 
corruption and drinking alcohol were positively correlated with smuggling, while returned 
checks had a negative impact on smuggling. These results are consistent with those of Smith 
and Christou (2009), Merton (1967) and Noguera (1996). Furthermore, all macroeconomic 
variables affecting smuggling including tariffs on imports, misery index, illiteracy, gap 
of exchange rate, index of openness of economy and the size of government increased 
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(2000), Schneider (2005) and Wang et al. (2006). Moreover, variables affected by smuggling 
including liquidity and energy consumption were found to be positively correlated with 
smuggling. This finding is in line with the findings by Albu et al. (2010), Bajada and 
Schneider (2009), Dobre and Alexandru (2009), Schneider (2015), Schneider and Enste 
(2000) and Wang et al. (2006). Likewise, divorce and misery indexes were the most effective 
variables on smuggling. Besides, studying the growth trend of smuggling in Iran revealed 
that the minimum growth of smuggling was -16.9% in 1987, while the maximum growth 
was 13% in 1996 and 2009. It was also found that the relative volume of smuggling (a 
percentage of GDP) reached from 22% in 1984 to its lowest volume of 16% in 1996, and 
it went up to peak at 23% in 2015. Although studying the volume of smuggling in Iran 
followed a fluctuating trend, this trend was found to be an upward one. Finally, the results 
of this study revealed that the average amount of smuggling in the research period in Iran 
constituted 19.5% of its GDP.
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